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Abstract—PHYSEC based message authentication can, as an
alternative to conventional security schemes, be applied within
Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communication (URLLC) scenarios
in order to meet the requirement of secure user data transmis-
sions in the sense of authenticity and integrity. In this work,
we investigate the performance of supervised learning classifiers
for discriminating legitimate transmitters from illegimate ones
in such scenarios. We further present our methodology of data
collection using Software Defined Radio (SDR) platforms and the
data processing pipeline including e.g. necessary preprocessing
steps. Finally, the performance of the considered supervised
learning schemes under different side conditions is presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The upcoming demand for automation in our everydays
life is increasing continuously. Many URLLC services, such as
automated traffic systems, telesurgery and many more are not
far from becoming a reality or already are. In order to meet the
high requirements for this type of services, new approaches,
especially whithin the field of information security, need to be
considered. Beside authenticity, integrity and confidentiality
of the data to be transmitted over wireless links have to be
ensured in order to prohibit a wide range of passive and active
cyber attacks. Confidentiality can be ensured by encryption of
messages, e.g. using an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[1] cipher suite. This operation does not produce any overhead
in message size (except zero padding). Whereas in case of
message authenticity and integrity schemes some amount of
overhead is generated in the sense of authentication tags,
e.g. when a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used or
cryptographic certificates, which both need to be attached to a
message respectively. E.g., the recommendation of the Internet
Engineering Task Force is to either use a cipher based MAC
(CMAC), e.g. based on a AES-128 block cipher, or a hash
based MAC (HMAC) which is based on a cryptographic hash
function. For AES-128 based CMAC a maximum shortening
to 64 Bit is recommended [2], while for HMAC a minimum
MAC size of 80 Bit is recommended [3]. If we now assume
that the payload of a URLLC message in the uplink has a
length of 400 Bit (the dimension of this assumption is e.g.
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confirmed by [4] and [5]), then the overhead and with this
the additional latency introduced in case of a AES-128 based
CMAC of 64 Bit length would be 13.8%. Another important
issue is, that key based schemes such as MAC are only able
to protect the message payload from the mentioned attacks.
An attacker is still able to perform attacks such as address
spoofing, or even worse, record a message and replay it after a
while (if counters are used to prohibit that, additional overhead
is added as well). Due to these drawbacks, Physical Layer
Security (PHYSEC) based message authentication can be used
alternatively. Hereby, the physical properties of the radio link
signal are taken into account in order to identify, by which
user a message was originally transmitted and whether it was
modified during the wireless transmission. As we focus on
URLLC here, it can be assumed that frequent and periodic
data transmissions (e.g. within the order of 10s of ms [4],
[5]) and consequently channel estimation at the same rate is
available. For experimental evaluation, we consider an Orthog-
onal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) system and
based on the respective frequency domain channel estimations,
we decide from which source a received data packet was
transmitted.
The remainder of the work is organized as follows. In section
II we give a short overview on related work with respect
to previous considered approaches and in section III we
describe the system model. The approach of Physical Layer
(PHY) based message authentication is presented in section IV
and the respective application of Machine Learning (ML) in
section V. In section VI we present the results of our work in
form of an experimental evaluation of the considered approach
and section VII finally concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Several approaches on exploiting characteristics of the PHY
in order to derive security functionalities (PHYSEC) have been
investigated recently. In [6] an overview is given on PHYSEC
functions derived from the wireless channel. While many
works have focused on extracting secret keys (e.g. to be used
for encryption and decryption of user data), such as [7], [8],
[9], the focus of our work is to identify the original transmitter
of data packets by exploiting the related PHY metadata.
First, statistical methods were used for PHYSEC based
authentication, e.g. [10], where an approach based on hy-
pothesis testing is presented for static scenarios. It is later
extended to mobile and time-variant scenarios in [11]. Though
the results of these works are plausible, they are obtained
from simulations of the wireless channel only and therefore,
it could not be proven, whether the methods also work for
real world channels. Our work is in contrast considering
measurements from real world wireless channels. Additionally,
such testing methods require proper setting of the detection
thresholds. In order to overcome this, ML based methods were
proposed in recent years for PHYSEC based authentication
as an alternative. In [12], two approaches based on Support
Vector Machines and Linear Fisher Discriminant Analysis
respectively, are presented that yielded acceptable results. A
Gaussian Mixture Model based technique in combination with
exploitation of the channel responses for different antenna
modes is considered in [13]. Due to these promising results,
the goal of our work is to further investigate ML based iden-
tification methods, especially such using supervised learning.
In previous works, various PHY features ranging from hard-
ware characteristics such as Carrier Frequency Offset (CFO) to
channel characteristics such as impulse or frequency responses
have been used in order to identify the associated transmitters
of data packets. E.g. the approach in [14] is based on time
domain channel estimation within a single carrier system. In
contrast to that, we will focus on multi carrier systems in
our work as they are more common nowadays. The authors in
[15] consider a cellular Internet-of-Things system and propose
a scheme for channel based message authentication of nodes
with the help of anchor nodes, which are assumed to have
set up trust to the concentrator node before using Received
Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) values. Also, in [16] an
RSSI based approach for body area networks is presented. As
we only consider single links, a single and onedimensional
feature might not be sufficient in order to reliable authenticate
transmitters of the corresponding messages. Therefore, we will
use the channel frequency response within OFDM systems
in order to identify respective transmitters. The work in [17]
considers a multilayer approach based on OFDM to guar-
antee authentication of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
packets. In [18], a Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO)
OFDM system is considered and a generalized likelihood
ratio test is used as detection method. Further, the authors
derive information theoretic bounds for the channel based
detection problem. In [19] and [20] the authors use a Single
Input Multiple Output (SIMO) system in order to detect the
transmitter of data packets based on the respective Line of
Sight (LOS) components. They further develop models in
order to estimate the delays within message delivery in case of
false alarms or misdetection and considere a variety of attack
strategies, such as disassociation or sybil attacks.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, the system concept, as well as the channel
estimation technique, which is used to derive the PHY meta-
data in our work, are introduced. Further, the attacker model is
presented and we derive possible attack scenarios with respect
to URLLC.
Fig. 1: System Model
Here, we consider a wireless (public) channel between two
users, Alice and Bob, who want to exchange authenticated
messages with each other over this channel. A third user Eve,
who is an adversarial user, tries to inject illegal messages
masqueraded as one of the legal users Alice or Bob. This
can e.g. be done by reusing the radio ressources allocated to
either Alice or Bob (in case of centralized Radio Resource
Management (RRM)) or by spoofing their addresses (in case
of competetive/decentralized RRM). Fig. 1 shows the possible
message flows over the wireless channel for all considered
users. Messages transmitted by users are denoted with xu and
messages received by users with yu, where u denotes user
Alice (u = A), Bob (u = B) or Eve (u = E).
A. Physical Layer Metadata
In PHYSEC schemes, PHY protocol metadata is used in
order to provide lightweight security measures. This metadata
can either originate from the transceiver hardware (e.g. radio
fingerprints or clock skew) or can originate from characteris-
tics of the wireless channel (e.g. RSSI or channel estimation
data). In the first case, it is already challenging for an attacker
to spoof these characteristics by using default hardware (off-
the-shelf). On the other hand, this also requires an additional
effort for the legitimate receiver in order to detect these
characteristics and increases the receiver complexity and cost.
For the second case, the respective data is typically available
and accessible in any radio protocol. Therefore, in our work,
we focus on channel based metadata and especially channel
estimation data, which is e.g. computed at the receiver side in
form of a frequency domain channel estimation (OFDM based
systems). The received signal at a user ui in such systems is
yui =Huiujxuj + nuiuj (1)
with
Huiuj = [h
0
uiuj
, . . . , hM−1uiuj ] (2)
being the M -dimensional channel matrix of the frequency-
selective Single Input Single Output (SISO) fading channel
between user ui and uj (transmitter) and h
ℓ
uiuj
being the
complex gain of the ℓ-th sample in frequency domain (ℓ =
0, . . . ,M − 1). It can be estimated as
Hˆuiuj =Huiuj + ǫuiuj (3)
by user ui. Due to noise nuiuj which is modelled as a gaussian
random variable with zero mean and variance σ2
nuiuj
the
channel estimation is not perfect and errors ǫuiuj occur.
B. Attacker Model
A typical scenario for an attacker Eve is, that he is at
a spatially different location compared to Bob and Alice
(we assume a distance of more than the wavelength of the
transmitted signal respectively) and uses advanced equipment
such as directed antennas and high sensitivity receivers in
order to maximize the coverage to his benefits. We also assume
perfect knowledge of the underlying communication protocol
at Eve to run active attacks such as masquerade attacks, replay
attacks or address spoofing attacks by introducing messages
xE. It is not assumed that Eve is gaining physical access to
Alice or Bob to accomplish invasive attacks such as hardware
modification. Further, other active attacks such as Denial-of-
Service attacks due to jamming are not considered as well. It is
assumed, that the legal communicating participants Bob and
Alice have already carried out initial user authentication to
each other and have set up trust in a secure way by using
cryptographic certificates or MACs. Attacks on the initial
authentication stage are not considered. Further, we assume
that Eve is, depending on the current attack strategy, spoofing
on transmission slots which are actually allocated to Bob by
using a higher transmit power in order to make Alice overhear
Bobs transmissions. In order to successfully carry out attacks,
the receive power of Eves transmissions has actually to be
higher, compared to the receive power of Bobs transmissions
at Alice.
IV. PHYSEC BASED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
One of the main characteristics, which can be exploited in
PHYSEC based schemes, is the spatial decorrelation property
of the wireless channel. It denotes, that channel characteristics
are varying based on the location of a transceiver. This holds
already true for small variations in the spatial domain which
are in the order of the wavelength of the transmitted signal,
due to positive and negative superposition of wireless signals,
caused by e.g. reflection and scattering. In our case, let us
assume, that Bob wants to transmit authenticated messages
to Alice. Therfore, within a first step, Alice will estimate
the channel as HˆAB(k) when receiving message yA(k) at
times k = 0, ..., T − 1 from user Bob (transmits xB(k)).
In order to prohibit any spoofing attacks by Eve during time
k = 0, ..., T − 1, the messages xB(k) sent by Bob at times
k = 0, ..., T − 1 need to contain cryptographic information
from higher layers (e.g. certificates or authentication tags).
Next, if Alice wants to authenticate Bob as the transmitter
of further received messages yA(k) at time k ≥ T , this
can be achieved by comparing the new channel estimations
Hˆ(k), k ≥ T to the previous collected channel estimations
HˆAB(k), k = 0, ..., T − 1. Based on these assumptions, there
are two hypothesis about the origin of the respective estimated
channel Hˆ(k), k ≥ T and consequently the respective payload
of it, either
H0 : Hˆ(k) due to xB(k), or
H1 : Hˆ(k) due to xE(k).
(4)
In case of hypothesis H0
Hˆ(k) =HAB(k) + ǫAB(k), (5)
and in case of hypothesis H1
Hˆ(k) =HEB(k) + ǫEB(k). (6)
Due to temporal variations in wireless channels, e.g. due
to doppler fading, the reference channel estimation used for
comparison needs to be updated accordingly. Otherwise it
is not possible to distinguish between channel variations
and messages introduced by an attacker after some point.
Therefore, the update interval should be below the channel
coherence time Tc of the HAB channel in order to catch up
with these variations. Whereas in both cases, the temporal
difference between two subsequent channel estimations should
always be below Tc.
V. SUPERVISED LEARNING
This section introduces the concept of supervised ML
based classification. Further, we introduce the necessary data
processing steps (pipeline) including data prepocessing, the
hyperparameter optimization strategy we applied and how the
performance of classifiers for the PHYSEC based message
authentication task can be evaluated.
A. ML based Classification
The ML classifiers that were applied to the problem of
PHYSEC based authentication are introduced in detail in
section VI including their hyperparameter spaces. In general
in supervised learning based classification, the goal is to learn
the function f(x) = wTx + b (or its parameters), which
maps the input data x = [x1, ..., nN ], xk ∈ R
d to the outputs
x = [y1, ..., yN ], yk ∈ {−1, 1} (binary classification), the
regularized training error
E(w, b) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
L(yk, f(xk)) + αR(w), (7)
has to be minimized. Here, L is the loss function, R is the
regularization or penalty term and α ∈ R+0 is a hyperparame-
ter.
B. Data Processing Pipeline
Within this subsection, the processing pipeline including
functionalities such as data pre-processing, hyperparameter
optimization and finally testing the different ML models in
order to evaluate their performance.
1) Preprocessing: The following preprocessing steps are
applied to the validation and testing datasets respectively, in
order to fit the classifiers. First, the magnitudes
F (k) =
∣∣Hˆ(k)
∣∣, k = 0, . . . , N (8)
of the complex channel gains are calculated for each data sam-
ple Hˆ(k). As it is in some cases necessary to reduce the di-
mensionalityM of the the input feature in order to avoid over-
fitting or underfitting, we also add a preprocessing step for that
purpose. This reduces the number of features of the original
sample from M = 48 to Mred ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 16, 24, 48]
by either sampling the original feature vector at the respective
rate yielding
F red(k, ℓ
∗) = F (k,
ℓ∗M
Mred
), ℓ∗ = 0, . . . ,Mred − 1, (9)
or by applying a mean function according to
F red(k, ℓ
∗) =
Mred
M
(ℓ∗+1)M
Mred
−1∑
j= ℓ
∗M
Mred
F (k, j), ℓ∗ = 0, . . . ,Mred−1,
(10)
where ℓ∗ denotes the index of the features in the new feature
dimension Mred and ℓ the index in the original feature
dimension.
The next steps involves a conversion of the time series
data F red(k, ℓ
∗) into the a format that can be processed by
a supervised classifier according to equation 7. A sample
Fwindow(k) at time k now consists of the original (reduced)
sample F red(k), as well as the W previous samples, yielding
Fwindow(k) = [F red(k),F red(k − 1), . . . ,F red(k −W )].
(11)
Next, the data sets are split into training and validation or
testing sets, which are used to fit the classifiers (training) and
validate (grid search) or test them (performance evaluation).
The training set is given by
F train = [Fwindow(0), . . . ,Fwindow(Ntrain − 1)], (12)
and the remaining samples are used for validating or testing
respectively. Finally, the training and validation/testing data is
normalized. We calculate the mean and variance of the training
set, then the training set is transformed to
F
norm
train =
F train −mean(F train)
std(F train)
, (13)
whereas the validation set (and testing set respectively) is
transformed according to
F
norm
valid =
F valid −mean(F train)
std(F train)
. (14)
2) Grid Search: In order to find the optimal hyperparame-
ters
λ∗ = argmin
λ∈Λ
mean
x
(valid)
k
L(y
(train)
k , fλ(x
(train)
k ) (15)
to the given classification task, we use an exhaustive grid
search. For each model, possible options for each hyperpa-
rameter are given as input and the respective models are fitted
and validated on all combination of hyperparameters. For this,
we only use a part of the overall Ltotal = Lvalid +Ltest data
sets, which we call the validation set. It consists of Lvalid data
sets. We use the accuracy metric in order to select the optimal
hyperparameter set for each classifier, which is given by
PA =
1
N
N−1∑
k=Ntrain
ypred(k)− ytrue(k), (16)
where ypred is the label vector predicted by the respective
classifier (user Bob or Eve is the transmitter) and ytrue the
true label vector.
3) Classifier Performance Testing: After deriving the opti-
mal hyperparameters for each classifier, the remaining Ltest
data sets are used in order to evaluate their performance
on the given classification task. For that purpose, beside the
accuracy metric, e.g. other metrics such as Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curves might be used.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe the process of acquisition of
channel estimation data and how the data is further processed
in order to evaluate the introduced ML classifiers. We present
the respective results and discuss them.
A. Data Acquisition
In order to obtain realistic channel estimation data, we used
Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) B210 SDR plat-
forms and an OFDM based transmission systems by making
use of the GNURadio [21] OFDM transmitter and receiver
baseband processing blocks. These provide the functionality
for channel estimation based on the Schmidl and Cox method
[22] using the respective preamble symbols. An OFDM setup
with an Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) size of 64 is considered
with 48 active subcarriers. The cyclic prefix length is 16
samples, whereas the bandwidth is 10 MHz and the carrier
frequency is 2.484 GHz. Each data packet consists of 2
preamble symbols, which are used for channel estimation
and frequency offset estimation at the receiver and N data
symbols. Here, packets are transmitted with a periodicity of
10ms, which yields us a vector of 48 complex symbols for
each received OFDM packet (only the active subcarriers are
considered for channel equalization). We consider a static
setup where all participants do not move during transmitting
and receiving. The environment is a mixed office/lab area with
Fig. 2: Environment with different Bob and Eve positions
TABLE I: Parameter space of all classifiers candidates
Model Parameter Options
SGDClassifier
loss [hinge, log, modified huber, squared hinge, perceptron]
Penalty [none, l2, l1, elasticnet]
alpha [10−6, 10−5, 10−4, 10−3, 10−2]
l1 ratio [0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1]
max iter [1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000]
tol [10−5, 10−4, 10−3, 10−2, 10−1]
learning rate [constant, optimal, invscaling, adaptive]
eta0 [0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1]
Perceptron
penalty [none, l2, l1, elasticnet]
alpha [10−6, 10−5, 10−4, 10−3, 10−2]
max iter [1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000]
tol [10−5, 10−4, 10−3, 10−2, 10−1]
PassiveAgressiveClassifier
C [0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100]
max iter [1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000]
tol [10−5, 10−4, 10−3, 10−2, 10−1]
Loss [hinge, squared hinge]
RandomForestClassifier
n estimators [1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000]
criterion [gini, entropy]
min samples split [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
min samples leaf [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
max features [none, auto, sqrt, log2]
KNeighborsClassifier
n neighbors [2, 4, 6, 8, 10]
algorithm [auto, ball tree’, ’kd tree’, ’brute’]
leaf size [10, 20, 30, 40, 50]
p [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
SVC
C [0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100]
kernel [linear, poly, rbf, sigmoid]
degree [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
tol [10−5, 10−4, 10−3, 10−2, 10−1]
max iter [1, 10, 100, 1000, 10000]
LinearDiscriminantAnalysis
solver [svd, lsqr]
tol [10−5, 10−4, 10−3, 10−2, 10−1]
shrinkage [none, auto]
a lot of objects and metal walls. We record the respective data
for several different locations of Bob and Eve respectively,
yielding multiple different constellations of Bob-Alice and
Eve-Alice pairs as depicted in fig. 2. In total, we acquire
data from Ltotal = 10 different position constellations of the
users. Further, the Attack Intensity (AI) of Eve PAI denotes
the amount of packets injected by Eve based on the total
number of packets N = 100000 transmitted by Bob and Eve
in addition. In case of a transmission of Eve, we assume, as
mentioned in section III-B, that Bobs regular transmission is
interfered by Eve (e.g. using a comparatively higher transmit
power). Further, we assume that there is always at least one
packet transmitted by each of the users within the Ntrain
training samples.
B. Processing Pipeline
In order to finally derive the performance of the classifiers,
their hyperparameters need to be selected first. In table I, an
overview of the whole grid of hyperparameter options for all of
the investigated classifiers is given. We execute the grid search
step as introduced in section V-B2 on Lvalid = 2 data sets in
order to find the optimal hyperparameters λ∗ for each classifier
respectively. These are listed in table III. Finally, the classifiers
are parameterized with these sets and we use Ltest = 8 testing
data sets in order to derive their classification performance for
the task of PHYSEC based message authentication.
C. Results
Fig. 3 shows the performance of the classifier candidates
depending on different side conditions. In fig. 4b, the AI
was changed within a range between 5% and 25%. Some
classifiers such as the Stochastic Gradient Descent Classifier
(SGDC), Random Forest Classifier (RFC), Support Vector
Classifier (SVC) and Linear Discriminant Analysis Classifier
(LDAC) perform quite well under varying AIs, whereas the
performance of the Gaussian Naive Bayes Classifier (GNBC)
and K-Neighbors Classifier (K-NC) decrease with increasing
AIs. Fig. 4c shows the performance of the classifier candidates
under different feature dimension using the feature reduction
scheme according to (10). Here, the SGDC and LDAC perform
the best with an accuracy of 100% with at least 16 features.
TABLE II: Validation and testing parameters
Parameter Variable Value
No. of data sets Ltotal 10
No. of validation data sets Lvalid 2
No. of testing data sets Ltest 8
original feature dimension M 48
Reduction method - mean
No. of training samples Ntrain 10
Window size W 5
Attack intensity PAI 25%
No. of samples in each data set N 100000
SGDClassifier
PassiveAggressiveClassifier
GaussianNB
RandomForestClassifier
KNeighborsClassifier
SVC
LinearDiscriminantAnalysis_svd
LinearDiscriminantAnalysis_lsqr
5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0
Attack Intensity [%]
100
9×10−1 A
(a) Detection accuracy under different Attack Intensites
0 10 20 30 40 50
Feature Dimension [# of Features]
100
7×10−1
8×10−1
9×10−1

A
(b) Detection accuracy under different feature dimensions
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Training Data [# of Samples]
100
5×10−1
6×10−1
7×10−1
8×10−1
9×10−1

A
(c) Detection accuracy under different train vector sizes
1 2 3 4 5
Window Size [# of Samples]
100
9×10−1 A
(d) Detection accuracy under different window sizes
Fig. 3: Accuracy metrics for detection of the true transmitter for all classifiers under different side constraints
The performance of all other candidates saturates at specific
limits, e.g. the K-NCs performance reaches a maximum of
81% accuracy from a feature dimension of 6. If a different
amount for the training samples is considered, all candidates
have a poor performance of below 90% when only 2 training
data samples are used. The performance of each classifier
increases, if more training data is used. E. g. the performance
of the SGDC and LDAC both reach 100% accuracy, if 8 or
more training samples are used, whereas the performance of
the SVC does not further increase after 6 training samples
and keeps constant at 86%. In fig. 4e, the dependence of
the performance on different window sizes used within 11
is shown. Here, the performance of all classifiers does not
increase, by taking more past samples into account. The
performance of the SGDC and LDAC stays constant at 100%
independent of the window size W , whereas the performance
of the RFC and SVC keeps at that value at least until a window
size of 3 and decreases for higher window sizes W ≥ 4.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Under specific scenarios, the application of supervised
learning algorithms for channel based message authentication
is a promising alternative to conventional security measures
such as MAC. Especially within URLLC services, a consider-
able amount of radio resource overhead can be saved. Though
the measured performance of some classifiers is comparable
to the performance of conventional schemes in our scenario,
it also needs to be validated for various other scenarios, such
as e. g. mobile setups. Further, other features that are used
in addition to channel estimates might yield more robust
PHYSEC schemes in order to achieve the goal of message
authentication and integrity checking. Another point for future
work is to estimate Eves training data, as attackers might not
be present yet during the initialization stage. Further, more
advanced attacks strategies might be investigated in order to
test the robustness of the detection schemes.
TABLE III: Optimal hyperparameters of each classifier
Model Parameter Options
SGDClassifier
loss log
Penalty elasticnet
alpha 10−2
l1 ratio 1
max iter 10000
tol 10−5
learning rate adaptive
eta0 0.5
PassiveAgressiveClassifier
C 0.1
max iter 1
tol 10−5
Loss hinge
RandomForestClassifier
n estimators 100
criterion entropy
min samples split 3
min samples leaf 1
max features log2
KNeighborsClassifier
n neighbors 2
algorithm auto
leaf size 10
p 2
SVC
C 0.1
kernel linear
degree 1
tol 10−5
max iter 10
LinearDiscriminantAnalysis
solver [svd, lsqr]
tol 10−5
shrinkage auto
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